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POLLAK, District Judge. 
     This is the second time that this matter has come before this 
court.   
     Appellants Frances and Joseph Livingstone commenced this civil 
rights suit, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  1983, in January, 1991 against 
defendants North Belle Vernon Borough, Fayette City Borough, 
Washington Township, Officer Darhl Snyder, Officer Raymond Moody, 
and Officer Frank E. Monack.  The defendants moved for summary 
judgment, asserting that the Livingstones' claims were barred by an 
agreement said to have been made in 1990 in which the Livingstones 
waived any civil claims in exchange for the termination of a 
criminal prosecution of Frances Livingstone.  (Agreements like this 
one, in which a criminal defendant waives potential civil claims in 
exchange for the dismissal of the case against her, are called 
"release-dismissal agreements.") 
     The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.  In Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 
1205 (3d Cir. 1993) (in banc) ("Livingstone I"), this court 
reversed, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether the Livingstones had concluded the release-dismissal 
agreement voluntarily.  12 F.3d at 1214.  In that opinion, we also 
observed that the agreement raised a number of other possible legal 
questions, including whether its enforcement would be in the public 
interest and whether it was invalidated by the municipalities' 
failure to formally ratify it.   
     On remand, the district court granted partial summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants as to the latter two questions, finding 
that the agreement's enforcement would be in the public interest 
and that no formal ratification was necessary.  The district court 
then conducted a jury trial devoted to the single question whether 
the Livingstones had concluded the release-dismissal agreement 
voluntarily.  The jury found that the Livingstones did indeed 
voluntarily conclude the release-dismissal agreement.  Accordingly, 
the district court ordered that judgment be entered in favor of the 
defendants and against the Livingstones as to all of the 
Livingstones' claims.  This appeal followed. 
 
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History 
A.  Livingstone I. 
     In Livingstone I, we compendiously summarized this case's 
elaborate factual and procedural history.  It seems efficient to 
reproduce that summary here verbatim.  (Except as noted, all 
footnotes and all emendations are from Livingstone I.) 
 
          This civil suit filed by Frances and Joseph Livingstone 
     against the police officers and municipalities arose from the 
     conduct of the police officers on the night of January 12-13, 
     1989, at the Livingstone home in Washington Township, 
     Pennsylvania.  During a family argument between Carrie 
     Livingstone, age twenty-two, who was unmarried and living at 
     her parents' home with her fourteen-month-old son, and Joseph, 
     her father, Mr. Livingstone struck Carrie on the face, causing 
     her lip to split and bleed.  Carrie ran out of the house and 
     to the community ambulance service across the street, where an 
     employee called the police.  When Officer Frank Monack 
     arrived, Carrie told him that her father had struck her and 
     that her parents were holding her son without her consent.  
 
          Monack, who was at that time an officer in the Washington 
     Township Police Department and is now Chief of Police, radioed 
     for assistance pursuant to an intermunicipal police 
     cooperation agreement.  Raymond Moody, who was and is the  
     Chief of Police for the Borough of Fayette City, and Darhl 
     Snyder, an officer in the North Belle Vernon Police 
     Department, responded.  They proceeded to the Livingstone home 
     where Mr. Livingstone permitted them to enter for the  
     purpose, he later testified, of discussing possible criminal 
     charges against him arising out of the incident.  Following a 
     brief discussion, Monack and Snyder accompanied Mr. 
     Livingstone outside, and Monack told him to go to the nearby 
     police station to make a statement.  No charges were filed 
     against Mr. Livingstone that evening or at any later time.  
 
          Monack and Snyder then reentered the Livingstone 
     household, this time in search of Carrie's son and admittedly 
     without a warrant or court order.  Mrs. Livingstone had 
     retreated to the back bedroom with her grandson, and had 
     locked and barricaded the door.  When she refused to open the 
     door, Monack picked the lock and then tried to push the door 
     open.  From the partially opened door, Mrs. Livingstone hit 
     him with a fishing rod and scratched him.  Monack and Snyder 
     broke the door down to enter the room, and then Monack told  
     Mrs. Livingstone she was under arrest.  
 
          Mrs. Livingstone testified that both men struck her, 
     causing her to lose consciousness and sustain bruises, 
     lacerations, lost teeth, and head injuries.  According to 
     defendants, they used force only for the purpose of getting  
     handcuffs on her after she struck the officer, and a stun gun 
     to subdue her because she was screaming and kicking.  Snyder 
     held her down while Monack used the gun.  Mrs. Livingstone 
     claims that Monack then said "you want a thrill, I'll give you 
     a thrill" and applied the stun gun between her legs.  A 
     medical examination conducted at the hospital that night notes 
     a burn in the vulval area.  
 
          The officers removed Mrs. Livingstone, handcuffed, from 
     the house.  She states that they dragged her outside and 
     dropped her several times, banging her head, and then left her 
     lying in cold muddy water for hours.  The officers claim that  
     her thrashing caused them all to fall, and that she refused to 
     get up.   
 
          On January 13, 1989, the morning after the altercation, 
     Mrs. Livingstone was charged by Monack, on behalf of the 
     Washington Township Police Department, with disorderly 
     conduct, aggravated assault, terroristic threats, resisting 
     arrest, and interference with custody.  At a preliminary 
     hearing on April 18, 1989, Mrs. Livingstone was held over for 
     a jury trial on all but the terroristic threats charge, and 
     the aggravated assault charge was reduced to simple assault.  
 
           The trial in Fayette County Court of Common Pleas began 
     on February 13, 1990, with attorney Thomas R. Ceraso 
     representing Frances Livingstone and Jack R. Heneks, Jr., an 
     Assistant District Attorney, representing the Commonwealth of  
     Pennsylvania.  Carrie Livingstone testified for the 
     prosecution, followed by Monack, Snyder, Moody, Police Chief 
     Robert Matthews of Washington Township, and Evelyn Rehe of the 
     community ambulance service.  The Commonwealth rested, and  
     Mrs. Livingstone demurred to all of the charges.  The demurrer 
     was granted on the charge of interference with custody on the 
     ground that there were no facts showing danger to the child, 
     but was denied as to the other charges.  
 
          Thereafter, Joseph Livingstone and his son, James, 
     testified for the defense.  Before Mrs. Livingstone was to 
     take the stand (and presumably would have testified about her 
     claims with regard to police use of a stun gun on her private 
     parts), the trial judge, Judge Cicchetti of the Court of 
     Common Pleas, met with Heneks and Ceraso to discuss whether 
     the matter could be resolved.  After settlement negotiations, 
     a conference was held in camera with Judge Cicchetti.  Present 
     were Moody, Monack, Matthews (now deceased), the Livingstones, 
     Ceraso, and Heneks.  
 
          Ceraso summarized the arrangement by stating that the 
     defense would move for a judgment of acquittal after James 
     Livingstone finished his testimony; that expenses for the 
     physical damage to the Livingstone house and for Mrs. 
     Livingstone's reasonable medical care would be paid; and that 
     once those bills were paid, the Livingstones would release any 
     civil claims.  Ceraso stated on the record:  
 
          there will be an agreement on the part of my client, Mrs. 
          Livingston[e], and also her husband, Joe Livingston[e], 
          who is present, that upon payment of reasonable medical 
          bills that w[e]re associated with the incident that  
          occurred, based on my forwarding those to Washington 
          Township with confirmation, together with bills 
          reflecting damage incurred at the household of Mr. and 
          Mrs. Livingston[e], that Washington Township will cause 
          the same to be paid.  At the time of final payment of 
          those bills, there will be a full and complete release 
          signed with reference to any civil action on the part of 
          Mr. and Mrs. Livingston[e].  It's also my understanding 
          that at that time there will also be a release signed by 
          Washington Township, or any of its proper officials, or 
          any member of the police force necessary to release Mr. 
          and Mrs. Livingston[e] from any liability . . . .  
 
      App. at 1109.  
 
          In response to the judge's inquiry, the parties voiced an 
     expression of assent.  The court asked whether "you all think 
     this is in the best interest for everyone" and Matthews, 
     Monack, and Heneks said they did.  App. at 1112.  When they 
     returned to the courtroom, Ceraso moved for a judgment of 
     acquittal on the criminal charges against Mrs. Livingstone, 
     which the court granted.  
 
          It is undisputed that the settlement agreement was never 
     reduced to writing.  The Livingstones never submitted for 
     payment any medical bills or household repair bills, and no 
     payments have been made.  The Board of Supervisors of  
     Washington Township took no action to officially ratify the 
     agreement until almost two years after the conference in 
     chambers, and only then after this suit was started.  There 
     is no evidence that the other two municipal defendants, North 
     Belle Vernon Borough and Fayette City Borough, have ever taken 
     any action to ratify any putative settlement.  
 
          On January 14, 1991, almost a year after the criminal 
     trial, the Livingstones filed this action against the police 
     officers and the three employer municipalities.  The complaint 
     consisted of seven claims:  a federal claim filed pursuant to 
     42 U.S.C.  1983 (1988), and state law claims alleging assault 
     and battery, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of 
     process, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of 
     emotional distress, and conversion.   
           The defendants filed motions to dismiss or, in the 
     alternative, for summary  judgment.  The district court 
     referred the case to a magistrate judge, who ordered the 
     parties to engage in discovery [footnote omitted] and to 
     submit briefs and materials in support of the motions.   
  
          In their briefs in support of summary judgment, 
     defendants argued that the suit was barred by the 
     release-dismissal agreement reached during the in cameraconference 
before Judge Cicchetti.  The Livingstones claimed 
     that they never intended to waive their rights to sue, 
     pointing out that the agreement was never reduced to writing 
     and that Washington Township never made the contemplated 
     payments.  They also contended that the agreement was never 
     properly entered into by the municipalities, as the Washington 
     Township Board of Supervisors never formally approved it and 
     the other boroughs' governing bodies never considered it, and 
     that the agreement was invalid and unenforceable under 
     Pennsylvania law.  
 
          On April 8, 1992, the magistrate judge submitted a Report 
     and Recommendation recommending that summary judgment be 
     granted for the defendants on the basis of the release- 
     dismissal agreement.  Although the court acknowledged that 
     Washington Township may not have formally approved the 
     agreement, it noted that two supervisors, a quorum, had 
     approved it, thereby satisfying Pennsylvania law.  Without 
     comment on the absence of the other municipalities and 
     officers from the agreement, the magistrate judge concluded 
     that plaintiffs had contracted with all of the defendants, and 
     thus the plaintiffs' civil suit was barred;  that the 
     agreement comported with due process because the plaintiffs 
     understood that they were waiving their rights to assert 
     future civil claims and had entered into the release 
     voluntarily; and that there was sufficient consideration 
     because the plaintiffs, in exchange for the surrender of their 
     potential civil claims, had secured the dismissal of the 
     criminal charges and a promise by the defendants not to sue 
     them.  
 
          Objections were filed but the district court adopted the 
     magistrate judge's opinion as its own and granted summary 
     judgment for all defendants.  This timely appeal followed. 
 
     Livingstone I, 12 F.3d at 1206-09. 
     With this background history as predicate, the court in 
Livingstone I then proceeded to review the elements of proof for a 
showing of voluntariness, finding that the parties seeking to 
enforce the release-dismissal agreement bore the burden of showing 
that the Livingstones' assent was "voluntary, deliberate and 
informed."  12 F.3d at 1211.  We concluded that the defendants had 
not met this burden with the certainty called for on summary 
judgment, given that Mrs. Livingstone was confused as to the terms 
of the release-dismissal arrangement, that the claimed release- 
dismissal agreement was never written down, and that the asserted 
agreement Ä assuming there was a meeting of the minds Ä was made, 
if at all, during a brief and ambiguous oral colloquy.  See id. at 
1211-14.  Accordingly, we reversed the grant of summary judgment 
and directed that the case be remanded for further proceedings. 
 
B.  Post-Livingstone I Proceedings 
     Following remand, the defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment challenging the Livingstones' complaint on a variety of 
grounds other than the release-dismissal agreement.  Their motions 
were referred to a magistrate judge, whose Report and 
Recommendation ("R&R") the district court then adopted without 
substantive comment.  In accordance with the recommendations of the 
magistrate judge, the district court ordered that (1) summary 
judgment be entered in favor of all defendants as to the 
Livingstones' claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 
and invasion of privacy; and (2) summary judgment be entered in 
favor of Officer Moody as to the assault and battery claims.  The 
district court denied summary judgment as to the Livingstones' 
constitutional claims, their claims of assault and battery against 
Officers Monack and Snyder, their claim of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress, and their conversion claim.  App. at 326, 
352. 
     The Livingstones then filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment renewing two arguments that they had already 
unsuccessfully made to the district court in the first round of the 
litigation.  These arguments were that the release-dismissal 
agreement was unenforceable because (a) the municipalities had not 
ratified it, as (assertedly) required by Pennsylvania law, and (b) 
the release-dismissal agreement had been concluded in a manner 
which violated "the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
public policy."  App. at 355.  The defendants responded with 
cross-motions for partial summary judgment that asserted that no 
ratification was necessary, because the Livingstones had failed to 
submit their medical bills to Washington Township for payment.  The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
on both the ratification question and the public-interest question. 
     The district court then conducted a jury trial limited to one 
question, whether the Livingstones voluntarily entered into the 
release-dismissal agreement.  After several days of trial, 
including extended testimony by Thomas R. Ceraso (Mrs. 
Livingstone's lawyer at her criminal trial), the jury found that 
the Livingstones did indeed enter into the agreement voluntarily.  
Accordingly, the district court entered judgment in favor of the 
defendants and against the Livingstones.  The Livingstones moved 
for a new trial, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and to 
amend the court's judgment to require Washington Township to pay 
household damages and medical bills to the Livingstones (apparently 
in order to enforce the terms of the release-dismissal agreement).  
These motions were denied, and this appeal followed. 
     On appeal, the Livingstones assert that the district court (1) 
erred in finding that the agreement was valid and enforceable even 
though the municipalities had not ratified it; (2) erred in ruling 
that the enforcement of the agreement was in the public interest as 
a matter of law; and (3) made a number of errors at the 
voluntariness proceeding.  We will discuss these questions in that 
order. 
     As to the second and third of these arguments, the district 
court, appellants, and appellees all assume that identical legal 
standards govern the enforcement of the release-dismissal agreement 
as to the Livingstones' section 1983 claims and as to their state- 
law claims.  However, as we suggested in Livingstone I, see 12 F.3d 
at 1209 n.6, this is not necessarily the case.  Federal common law 
governs the enforceability of the release-dismissal agreement as to 
the Livingstones' section 1983 claims, while we must look to 
Pennsylvania law to assess the enforceability of the agreement as 
to their state-law claims.  Thus, the legal standards applicable to 
the Livingstones' state-law claims will be discussed separately. 
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
     We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291.  
As to the municipal ratification and public-interest questions, on 
which the district court granted summary judgment, our review is 
plenary.  See Erie Telecommunications Inc. v. City of Erie, 853 
F.2d 1084, 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).  The appellants also assert that, 
at the voluntariness proceeding, the district court (1) gave an 
incorrect jury instruction, (2) erred in declining to give a 
requested jury instruction, and (3) made a number of incorrect 
evidentiary rulings.  To the extent that appellants claim that a 
jury instruction failed to state the proper legal standard, our 
review is plenary.  See Government of Virgin Islands v. Isaac, 50 
F.3d 1175, 1180 (3d Cir. 1995).  To the extent that appellants 
contest the district court's refusal to give particular jury 
instructions, our review is for abuse of discretion.  See id.  The 
evidentiary rulings that the appellants challenge are all 
discretionary rulings of the type that we review for abuse of 
discretion.  This includes rulings as to the relevance of evidence 
and as to its prejudicial effect, see In re Japanese Electronic 
Products, 723 F.2d 238, 257, 260 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other 
grounds, sub nom. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), and as to waiver of the attorney- 
client privilege, see United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 
1293 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 
III.  Municipal Ratification 
     The terms of the alleged release-dismissal agreement, as 
recited by Ceraso, were that:   
          there will be an agreement on the part of my client, Mrs. 
          Livingston[e], and also her husband, Joe Livingston[e], 
          who is present, that upon payment of reasonable medical 
          bills that w[e]re associated with the incident that  
          occurred, based on my forwarding those to Washington 
          Township with confirmation, together with bills 
          reflecting damage incurred at the household of Mr. and 
          Mrs. Livingston[e], that Washington Township will cause 
          the same to be paid.  At the time of final payment of 
          those bills, there will be a full and complete release 
          signed with reference to any civil action on the part of 
          Mr. and Mrs. Livingston[e].  It's also my understanding 
          that at that time there will also be a release signed by 
          Washington Township, or any of its proper officials, or 
          any member of the police force necessary to release Mr. 
          and Mrs. Livingston[e] from any liability . . . .  
 
Appellees North Belle Vernon Borough and Officer Darhl Snyder's 
App. at 30.  In short, the arrangement was apparently that, after 
the prosecution of Mrs. Livingstone was terminated, the 
Livingstones would submit bills for property damage and for medical 
costs to Washington Township.  Once the Township paid these bills, 
the Livingstones, the municipalities, and the police officers would 
then sign full mutual releases of civil claims.   
     The Livingstones concede that they never submitted their bills 
to Washington Township, as apparently required by the terms of the 
agreement.  The district court found that their failure to do so 
rendered it impossible for the municipal defendants to ratify the 
release-dismissal agreement, as "the public fisc cannot be 
allocated for an indefinite amount to a private party."  App. at 
377-78.  The district court did not, however, discuss an antecedent 
question:  whether (and how) a contract was ever formed between the 
Livingstones and the municipalities.  Conceptually, it would hardly 
be possible for the Livingstones to have rendered impossible the 
performance of a contract that was never formed. 
     Under Pennsylvania law, a township cannot enter into a binding 
contract except by a vote of the township's supervisors.  SeeAbington 
Heights School District v. Township of South Abington, 456 
A.2d 722, 724 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983).  North Belle Vernon Borough and 
Fayette City Borough never conducted such a vote, and Washington 
Township only did so after the present suit was filed.  On appeal, 
the Livingstones assert that the failure of the municipalities to 
ratify the release-dismissal agreement meant that no contract was 
ever formed between the Livingstones and the municipalities, and 
that the release-dismissal agreement is therefore unenforceable.   
     We will not address this question, however, because we find 
that it was not necessary for the municipalities to be parties to 
the release-dismissal agreement in order for it to be enforceable. 
It would suffice for the municipalities to have been third-party 
beneficiaries of an agreement concluded between the Livingstones 
and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and, indeed, the colloquy 
before Judge Cicchetti suggests that this is what was intended 
(assuming, of course, that a valid agreement was formed at all). 
The principal parties negotiating the purported release-dismissal 
agreement were the Livingstones (through Mrs. Livingstone's 
attorney, Ceraso) and the Commonwealth (through Heneks, an 
assistant district attorney).  The agreement's terms appear to have 
been that the Commonwealth would not oppose Mrs. Livingstone's 
motion for a judgment of acquittal.  In exchange, the Livingstones 
would submit their medical and household damages bills to 
Washington Township, and, when those bills were paid, would sign a 
full release of civil liability with all of the municipalities and 
police officers involved, reciprocal releases of civil liability 
being signed by those police officers and municipalities with 
potential claims against the Livingstones. 
     Although the municipalities and police officers were clearly 
intended to benefit from this agreement, the agreement's success 
did not require them to be parties to it.  The Livingstones were 
not harmed by the municipalities' lack of party status.  If 
Washington Township did not pay the Livingstones' actual expenses, 
or if one of the municipalities or officers refused to sign (or to 
negotiate in good faith towards) a release, the Livingstones would 
have lost nothing.  The criminal charges against Mrs. Livingstone 
could not have been reinstituted; moreover, the Livingstones would 
presumably have been free to file a civil action against any of the 
municipalities or police officers that failed to cooperate as 
anticipated.  
     An implicit term of this release-dismissal agreement is 
necessarily that the Livingstones could bring a civil suit against 
the municipalities or police officers only after the Livingstones 
had made a good-faith effort to negotiate towards reciprocal 
releases and those negotiations had failed.  This term follows from 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts  205 (1981), and that duty's correlative obligation not 
to act so as to defeat an agreement's objective.  The record 
indicates that the Livingstones did not make any effort to 
negotiate towards such reciprocal releases.  Hence, assuming that 
the release-dismissal agreement is otherwise valid and enforceable 
Ä the question that we will address next Ä the Livingstones' 
failure to seek mutual releases would seem to bar their suit.   
     The Livingstones also question whether North Belle Vernon 
Borough and Fayette City Borough Ä which I will refer to, for 
brevity, as "the two boroughs" Ä had the same status under the 
release-dismissal agreement as did Washington Township.  In the 
voluntariness proceeding in the district court, counsel for the 
Livingstones had requested that a specific question on the verdict 
form address the status of the two boroughs under the agreement.  
The district court declined to include such a question on the form, 
finding that Ceraso's statements in the colloquy before Judge 
Cicchetti included all three municipalities, and that all three 
therefore had the same status for purposes of the voluntariness 
question.  In response to the objections of the Livingstones' 
counsel to this ruling, the district court permitted him to argue 
to the jury that the ambiguous nature of the agreement between the 
Livingstones and the two boroughs rendered the release-dismissal 
agreement involuntary as a whole.  App. at 804-06. 
     Although the Livingstones' argument focuses on whether the 
release-dismissal agreement was voluntary as to the two boroughs, 
this issue cannot be completely disentangled from that of whether 
the agreement addressed the boroughs at all.  The colloquy before 
Judge Cicchetti is far from a model of clarity on this question.  
During the colloquy, Ceraso stated that he had  
     no objection if those police departments or those 
     municipalities also wish to be included in the release, 
     and we would then have reciprocal releases from them, and 
     we would let that up to their individual counsel to make 
     that decision, but we certainly would have no objection 
     in doing that so it would be reciprocal on both sides. 
Appellees North Belle Vernon Borough and Officer Darhl Snyder's 
App. at 31.  This statement can be construed either (1) as 
indicating that the Livingstones had undertaken to negotiate 
towards a civil release with the two boroughs (making the boroughs, 
with Washington Township, third-party beneficiaries of the release- 
dismissal agreement), or (2) as merely making an offer to those two 
municipalities. 
     The question of which of these readings of Ceraso's remarks is 
correct was not argued before the district court.  On remand, the 
district court should permit the parties to brief this question.  
In resolving this issue, the district court may consult all of the 
sources to which courts usually refer in determining the meaning of 
ambiguous contractual language, including, for instance, the course 
of the negotiations between the parties. 
      
IV.  The Public Interest 
     In Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987), a four- 
Justice plurality found that, as a matter of federal common law, a 
release-dismissal agreement will operate to bar a section 1983 
claim unless "the interest in [the agreement's] enforcement is 
outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by the 
enforcement of the agreement."  Id. at 392.  Justice O'Connor, 
whose fifth vote was dispositive, noted in a concurring opinion 
that it is the burden of the defendants to demonstrate that "a 
particular release executed in exchange for the dismissal of 
criminal charges was voluntarily made, not the product of 
prosecutorial overreaching, and in the public interest."  Rumery, 
480 U.S. at 401.   
     In Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993) (in banc), 
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1303 (1994), this court addressed the 
circumstances in which enforcement of a release-dismissal agreement 
will be in the public interest.  Cain made clear that the above- 
quoted passage from Justice O'Connor's Rumery concurrence should 
not be read to suggest that the "prosecutorial overreaching" and 
"public interest" questions are to be analyzed separately; rather, 
"the concept of prosecutorial misconduct is embedded in a larger 
inquiry into whether enforcing the release would advance the public 
interest."  Id. at 380; see also Lynch v. City of Alhambra, 880 
F.2d 1122, 1126 n.6 (9th Cir. 1989) (arguing that there is only one 
inquiry); but compare Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494, 500-01 (8th 
Cir. 1993) (apparently treating the analyses as distinct). 
     Cain found that a party seeking to demonstrate that the 
enforcement of a release-dismissal agreement is in the public 
interest must make two distinct showings, which we will call here 
Cain's "objective" and "subjective" elements.  Cain's objective 
element requires both that "the facts known to the prosecutor when 
the agreement was reached" must have sufficed to support the 
prosecutor's proffered public interest reason for concluding the 
agreement, and that this public-interest reason be a legitimate 
one.  7 F.3d at 381.  Relevant public interests include the 
interest, cited by the Court in Rumery, in avoiding the costs and 
disruptions associated with defending "marginal" or "frivolous" 
civil rights actions, Rumery, 480 U.S. at 395, and the 
countervailing interest, also cited by the Court, in detecting and 
deterring official misconduct.  See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394; id. at 
400 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
     Cain's subjective element is its requirement that: 
     the public interest reason proffered by the prosecutor must be 
     the prosecutor's actual reason for seeking the release. . . . 
     Any alternative to the 'actual reason' requirement creates the 
     real danger that actions taken pursuant to an improper motive, 
     such as to protect public officials from a meritorious civil 
     rights lawsuit, may be legally excused because a court later 
     finds that some 'benefit' might have been incidentally 
     achieved. 
 
7 F.3d at 381 (emphasis in original).  The party seeking to enforce 
the release-dismissal agreement bears the burden of proof on both 
of these elements. 
     In the present case, the district court denied a motion by the 
Livingstones that sought to establish as a matter of law that the 
enforcement of the release-dismissal agreement was contrary to the 
public interest, and instead entered summary judgment against the 
Livingstones on this question, finding that the enforcement of the 
agreement was in the public interest as a matter of law.  On 
appeal, the Livingstones challenge both rulings.  They argue, 
first, that the district court erred in denying their motion for 
summary judgment, and that it should have found the release- 
dismissal agreement unenforceable as a matter of law.  In the 
alternative, they contend that the district court erred in granting 
the appellees' motion for summary judgment, because there was a 
genuine issue of material fact as to prosecutorial motive.   
     The Livingstones' two arguments are founded on distinct 
elements of the Cain analysis.  Their argument that the district 
court erred in declining to find the release-dismissal agreement 
unenforceable as a matter of law is directed at Cain's objective 
element; it challenges the district court's conclusion that the 
facts known to the prosecutor at the time the release-dismissal 
agreement was concluded sufficed to establish that it was in the 
public interest to conclude such an agreement.  Their argument that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact as to prosecutorial 
motivation is directed at Cain's subjective component, which 
requires that the prosecutor's stated reason for concluding a 
release-dismissal agreement "must be the prosecutor's actual reasonfor 
seeking the release."  Cain, 7 F.3d at 381.  We will consider 
these arguments in that order.   
 
A.  Cain's Objective Element 
1.  The District Court's Analysis 
     The district court concluded that the facts known to the 
prosecutor at the time the agreement was concluded justified 
finding that the enforcement of the release-dismissal agreement 
would be in the public interest.  The court explained its 
conclusion as follows: 
 
     Here, Judge Cicchetti, who presided over the criminal trial 
     against Mrs. Livingstone and who supervised the execution of 
     the release-dismissal agreement, stated in the colloquy that 
     he was supportive of the agreement because he saw no benefit 
     to a criminal trial and that it was in everyone's best 
     interest to resolve the matter.  Mr. Heneks, the assistant 
     district attorney who was assigned to the case stated that he 
     believed that the Commonwealth would be well-served by the 
     resolution as well.  Later, in a sworn statement, Mr. Heneks 
     indicated that continuation of the criminal trial would have 
     created further conflict between the Livingstones and their 
     daughter who had reconciled their differences since the night 
     of the incident.  In addition, he stated that the agreement 
     saved the Commonwealth from spending further resources to 
     prosecute.  The reasons stated by Mr. Heneks are factors that 
     were known to him at the time the agreement was executed.  In 
     the absence of evidence that the motivation was improper, we 
     may accept his explanation.  In addition, each reason 
     constitutes an independent, legitimate reason which is 
     directly related to his prosecutorial responsibilities.  SeeRumery, 
480 U.S. at 398. 
      
App. at 380-381.  The court's analysis posits three public-interest 
rationales for upholding the release-dismissal agreement: the 
agreement's supervision by Judge Cicchetti, the desire of the 
Commonwealth to avoid further conflict between the Livingstones and 
their daughter, and the Commonwealth's wish to avoid expending more 
of the Commonwealth's resources to prosecute Mrs. Livingstone.  We 
will consider these three rationales seriatim. 
     As to the first of the three rationales, it is of course true 
that (1) the Rumery plurality noted that judicial supervision of 
release-dismissal agreements can "help ensure that the agreements 
did not result from prosecutorial misconduct," 480 U.S. at 399 
n.10, and (2) Justice O'Connor observed that such supervision can 
"bear on whether a release was voluntary and not the product of 
overreaching," id. at 401-02.  Judicial supervision can indeed be 
important in ensuring that an agreement was concluded voluntarily, 
and, to a lesser extent, that the prosecutor's stated reasons for 
seeking an agreement are genuine.  Judicial supervision is less 
relevant to Cain's objective inquiry, however, which focuses on the 
information known to the prosecutor.  At best, judicial supervision 
may help to reinforce a subsequent court's independent 
determination that a prosecutor had a sound public-interest reason 
for concluding a release-dismissal agreement.  As will become 
clear, it seems unlikely that Judge Cicchetti's supervision of the 
dismissal of the charges against Mrs. Livingstone played that role 
here. 
     Nor does Heneks' asserted desire to avoid further stress to 
the Livingstone family serve a particularly strong public interest.  
It is, of course, commendable for prosecutors to give some thought 
to the welfare of the accused's family.  In practice, however, the 
public would be rightly surprised were a prosecutor to place these 
considerations above, for instance, the public interest in 
punishing crime, or the public interest, expressed in section 1983, 
in exposing official abuse.  We do not think that the public's 
interest in avoiding strain to a defendant's family can, standing 
alone, be a legitimate reason for concluding a release-dismissal 
agreement. 
     Nor, finally, does Heneks' wish to avoid the cost of further 
prosecution carry much weight.  A desire to avoid the cost of 
prosecution (and of a related civil suit) may be an acceptable 
public-interest rationale for some release-dismissal agreements.  
As Justice O'Connor observed in Rumery: 
     [P]rosecutors may legitimately believe that, though the police 
     properly defused a volatile situation by arresting a minor 
     misdemeanant, the public interest in further litigation is 
     outweighed by the cost of litigation.  Sparing the local 
     community the expense of litigation associated with some minor 
     crimes for which there is little or no public interest in 
     prosecution may be a legitimate objective of a release- 
     dismissal agreement. 
 
480 U.S. at 399-400.  By definition, in any case in which a 
release-dismissal agreement has been concluded, the community will 
have avoided the cost of prosecution; thus, a prosecutor could 
assert that "the public interest in further litigation is 
outweighed by the cost of litigation" in any case.  In order to 
ensure that such assertions do not act as a blanket exception to 
the public-interest element of Rumery, the courts must subject 
those assertions to close scrutiny. 
 
2.  Marginal or Frivolous Nature of the Livingstones' Civil Rights 
Claims 
     The record does not indicate that Heneks considered whether 
the Livingstones' civil rights claims were marginal or frivolous 
before concluding the agreement.  In Cain, we stated that a 
prosecutor must conduct an "individualized analysis" of a 
defendant's civil rights claims before concluding a release- 
dismissal agreement, 12 F.3d at 383, and that in order for a 
release-dismissal agreement to be enforceable "there must be a 
case-specific showing that the released civil rights claims 
appeared to be marginal or frivolous at the time the agreement was 
made and that the prosecutor was in fact motivated by this reason."  
Id. 
     The question whether the facts known to Heneks could have 
supported the conclusion that the Livingstones' civil rights claims 
were marginal or frivolous was not addressed in the district 
court.  On this record, resolution of that question in the 
defendants' favor was a necessary predicate for a grant of summary 
judgment holding that the release-dismissal agreement was in the 
public interest.  We will, therefore, vacate the district court's 
grant of summary judgment and remand the case so that the parties 
can address the question whether the Livingstones' civil rights 
claims were regarded Ä and, if so, whether they were properly 
regarded Ä by the prosecuting attorney as marginal or frivolous. 
     We think that, on remand, the parties will, at a minimum, wish 
to take account of the material in this record which suggests that, 
at the time Heneks agreed to the dismissal of the charges against 
Mrs. Livingstone, considerable information pointing in the 
direction of significant police misconduct had come to Heneks' 
attention.  Of course, what is of record here cannot be deemed 
dispositive of the question whether Heneks could properly have 
concluded that the Livingstones' civil rights claims were marginal 
or frivolous, for the reason that the proceedings in the district 
court have not been focused on that issue.  Further evidence may be 
adduced on remand that casts the relevant events in a very 
different light.  But we think it may be helpful to relate the 
principally salient matter appearing in our current record in order 
to provide a point of departure for the proceedings on remand. 
     The most important item of evidence in this respect is the 
report of Dr. Noche, the emergency-room doctor who examined Mrs. 
Livingstone on the night of her encounter with the police.  That 
report indicates that Mrs. Livingstone had first or second degree 
burns in her vaginal area.  The substance of Dr. Noche's report 
was almost certainly known to Assistant District Attorney Heneks.  
The record does not contain any plausible explanation of how this 
burn came to appear on Mrs. Livingstone's genitalia Ä other than 
Mrs. Livingstone's own explanation, which was that it was the 
result of the police's deliberate misuse of a stun gun.  Nor is 
there any indication in the record that Heneks was aware of other 
evidence that contradicted the emergency-room report.  In short, 
it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Dr. Noche's report 
significantly corroborates Mrs. Livingstone's claim that the police 
deliberately applied a stun gun to her genitalia, an act that, if 
it did occur, would amount to an outrageous instance of police 
abuse. 
     It is possible that facts not in the present record would 
undermine some element of the foregoing analysis.  On remand, the 
parties should address (1) whether Heneks made a determination that 
the Livingstones' civil rights claims were marginal or frivolous, 
and, if so, on what basis he did so; (2) whether Heneks knew or 
should have known of the foregoing evidence of police misconduct; 
and (3) if Heneks did know, or should have known, of that evidence, 
whether other facts available to Heneks in some way undercut it.  
We emphasize that it would not suffice for the defendant 
municipalities and police officers to demonstrate on remand that 
Heneks was aware of other evidence that merely contradicted the 
foregoing evidence of police misconduct, as this would only 
establish that there was substantial evidence on both sides of the 
misconduct question.  Instead, defendants would have to 
demonstrate that Heneks was aware of other evidence that rendered 
the foregoing evidence of police misconduct fundamentally 
untrustworthy. 
     It is conceivable that the district court may conclude that 
Heneks was not aware, and had no reason to be aware, of some of the 
foregoing evidence of official misconduct, and that, not being 
apprised of this evidence, Heneks reasonably determined that the 
Livingstones' civil rights claims were marginal or frivolous.  That 
would not, however, be the end of the district court's inquiry.  
The district court would then have to address the further question 
whether enforcement of a release-dismissal agreement in the face of 
substantial evidence of police misconduct would be compatible with 
Rumery and Cain, notwithstanding that the evidence of misconduct 
was not known, or reasonably knowable, by the prosecutor at the 
time the prosecutor entered into what might appear, in retrospect, 
to be an improvident agreement. 
 
B.  Cain's Subjective Element: Prosecutorial Motivation 
     Cain's subjective element requires that the public-interest 
reasons cited by a party seeking to enforce a release be those that 
actually motivated the prosecutor to conclude the release.  That 
is, under Cain, a court may not enforce a release if it finds that 
the release was concluded for some reason different from that 
presented as justifying enforcement, even if the court believes 
that "some 'benefit'" would be "incidentally achieved" by 
enforcement.  Cain, 7 F.3d at 381. 
     The Livingstones challenge the district court's determination 
that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
the prosecutor's stated reasons for concluding the release- 
dismissal agreement were his actual reasons for doing so.  The 
district court based this determination on the following: (1) the 
charges against Mrs. Livingstone were filed the day after her 
encounter with the police; (2) the charges "correspond to the 
relevant conduct of Mrs. Livingstone according to the statement 
taken from Carrie Livingstone, and the affidavit which supports the 
complaint"; and (3) "discussions of settlement were initiated after 
nearly three days of testimony in the criminal trial."  App. at 
379-80.   
     We do not quarrel with these three propositions.  But they do 
not, in our judgment, constitute a sufficient predicate for the 
determination that there is no genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to whether the prosecutor's stated reasons were his real 
reasons.  As we have noted, on the record before this court it 
appears not unlikely that the prosecutor was aware of substantial 
evidence of police misconduct in the present case.  This lends 
credence to the inference that the prosecutor's decision to bring 
charges against Mrs. Livingstone, the manner in which he conducted 
the trial, and his decision to propose the conclusion of a release- 
dismissal agreement to the Livingstones may have been motivated by 
a desire to protect the relevant police officers and municipalities 
from liability.  Such a motivation would render the agreement 
unenforceable.  See Cain, 7 F.3d at 381. 
     None of the three propositions relied on by the district court 
eliminates the possibility that the prosecutor acted with an 
improper motive.  As to the fact that the charges against Mrs. 
Livingstone were filed promptly, it is true that, had the charges 
against Mrs. Livingstone been brought well after the incident, or 
after the police learned that she intended to sue, this might have 
indicated prosecutorial misconduct.  See Lynch v. City of Alhambra, 
880 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1989).  But the fact that the 
charges against her were brought promptly does not, conversely, 
demonstrate that no misconduct occurred.  As to the fact that the 
charges against Mrs. Livingstone were supported by independent 
evidence, charges need not be fabricated in order for a release- 
dismissal agreement to be the product of an improper prosecutorial 
motive.  The relevant question is instead whether the decision to 
pursue a prosecution, or the subsequent decision to conclude a 
release-dismissal agreement, was motivated by a desire to protect 
public officials from liability.  Finally, the fact that the 
discussions of settlement were initiated "after nearly three days 
of testimony in the criminal trial" is subject to many 
interpretations.  One interpretation which is at odds with summary 
judgment is that a purpose of the trial was to erode the 
Livingstones' resistance to signing a release.   
     We therefore find that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether the prosecutor's stated reasons for concluding 
the release-dismissal agreement at issue in the present case were 
his actual reasons.  Thus, should the district court find that 
information known to the prosecutor could have sufficed to 
establish that there was a legitimate public-interest reason for 
concluding a release-dismissal agreement, it should then conduct a 
jury trial to determine whether the prosecutor's stated reasons for 
concluding an agreement were his actual reasons for doing so. 
 
V.  Voluntariness 
A.  Standard of Proof of Voluntariness 
     The district court instructed the jury that the defendant's 
burden of proof in establishing the voluntariness of the release- 
dismissal agreement was one of "preponderance of the evidence."  
The Livingstones challenge that instruction, arguing that the 
standard should have been one of "clear and convincing evidence."  
We agree. 
     In Rumery, the Supreme Court had no occasion to consider the 
appropriate standard of proof; the language used by the Court in 
finding the release-dismissal agreement at issue in that case 
enforceable was consistent with either a preponderance standard or 
a standard of clear and convincing evidence.  Although we did not 
explicitly address the question of the appropriate standard of 
proof in Livingstone I, we did observe that oral release-dismissal 
agreements should be subjected to particularly exacting judicial 
scrutiny: 
     Ordinarily, the existence and terms of [a release-dismissal] 
     agreement can be resolved by reference to a written document.  
     While we do not hold that as a matter of law an oral agreement 
     to waive the right to sue in exchange for the dismissal of 
     criminal charges can never be valid, the absence of a written 
     release-dismissal agreement requires even more scrupulous 
     review by the courts than otherwise.  No published opinion of 
     any of the courts of appeals after Rumery has even considered, 
     much less sustained, an oral release-dismissal agreement.  
     Indeed, the Rumery Court never mentioned the possibility of an 
     oral release-dismissal agreement.  Justice Stevens, at least, 
     assumed that such agreements were written.  See Rumery, 480 
     U.S. at 417 n.22, 107 S.Ct. at 1205 n.22 ("A court may enforce 
     such an agreement only after a careful inquiry into the 
     circumstances under which the plaintiff signed the agreementand into 
the legitimacy of the prosecutor's objective in 
     entering into [it]." (emphasis added)) (Stevens, J., 
     dissenting). 
 
12 F.3d at 1212.  We then noted a number of advantages of written 
agreements.  These included the fact that they "allow the parties 
more opportunity for deliberate reflection," id., and that a 
written document facilitates negotiation as to the agreement's 
terms, see id. at 1213.  We also observed that a written release- 
dismissal agreement may provide a subsequent court with evidence as 
to "the parties' respective bargaining power."  Id.  For example, 
if the attorney for the party forgoing civil claims prepared the 
agreement, this may support the conclusion that the agreement was 
voluntary; if the prosecutor did so, and if he presented it in a 
manner that discouraged negotiation, this may support the 
conclusion that it was not.  See id. 
     In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme Court 
set forth its methodology in assigning standards of proof:  
 
     The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is 
     embodied in the Due Process Clause and in the realm of 
     factfinding, is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning the 
     degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the 
     correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
     adjudication.'  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370, 90 S.Ct. 
     1068, 1070, 25 L.Ed.2d. 368 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).  
     The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the 
     litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to 
     the ultimate decision. 
 
Id. at 423.  The Court then placed the three standards of proof 
within this broad framework.  The least demanding standard, that of 
a preponderance of the evidence, is appropriate to a "typical civil 
case involving a monetary dispute between private parties."  Id.  
Society's concern with the outcome of such a case is "minimal"; 
thus, it is appropriate to adopt a standard that allocates the risk 
of error between the litigants "in roughly equal fashion."  Id.  
The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, by contrast, is 
reserved for criminal cases, in which society wishes to "exclude as 
nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment."  Id. 
     Intermediate between these two standards is the one applicable 
in cases in which "the interests at stake . . . are deemed to be 
more substantial than mere loss of money."  Id. at 424.  The 
standard has been known by a variety of names, but "usually employs 
some combination of the words 'clear,' 'cogent,' 'unequivocal,' and 
'convincing.'" Id. at 424.  Examples of proceedings in which the 
Court has found a heightened standard of proof to be appropriate 
are proceedings to terminate parental rights, see Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); involuntary commitment proceedings, 
see Addington, 441 U.S. at 432; and deportation proceedings, seeWoodby v. 
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966). 
     The Court has stated that, in civil actions between private 
litigants, a standard of proof greater than one of a preponderance 
of the evidence will only apply in cases in which "'particularly 
important individual interests or rights are at stake.'"  Grogan v. 
Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Herman & MacLean v. 
Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1983)).  Thus, a preponderance 
standard suffices even in cases in which "severe civil sanctions" 
may ultimately be imposed, if those sanctions do not implicate 
particularly important interests or rights.  See Huddleston, 459 
U.S. at 389. 
     We find that the enforcement of the oral release-dismissal 
agreement at issue in this case would indeed implicate "important 
individual interests or rights."  Although the Livingstones' 
section 1983 claims are in form claims for money damages, 
underlying them is the Livingstones' interest in redressing a 
possible violation of their constitutional rights.  Moreover, 
section 1983 actions, when successful, do more than compensate 
injured plaintiffs: they serve the important public purpose of 
exposing and deterring official misconduct, and thereby protecting 
the rights of the public at large.  In Rumery, all nine Justices 
recognized the importance of ensuring that release-dismissal 
agreements do not encroach upon this purpose.  See Rumery, 400 U.S. 
at 395; id. at 400 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 419 (Stevens, 
J., dissenting). 
     A clear-and-convincing standard appropriately allocates more 
of the risk of error associated with oral release-dismissal 
agreements to those who seek to enforce them.  As we noted in 
Livingstone I, oral release-dismissal agreements raise particularly 
significant questions of voluntariness, as the lack of a written 
document may inhibit negotiation as to an agreement's terms and 
render it difficult for prospective parties to reflect on those 
terms.  We also observed in Livingstone I that an oral agreement 
ordinarily contains less evidence as to the course of the parties' 
negotiations than does a written agreement.  As a result, there is 
a greater risk of error in a jury's evaluation of whether an oral 
release-dismissal agreement was concluded voluntarily. 
     We think that those seeking to enforce a release-dismissal 
agreement should bear this greater risk.  Indeed, a "clear and 
convincing" standard will encourage prosecutors Ä who are likely to 
have comparatively frequent contact with release-dismissal 
agreements, and who have an interest in ensuring that those 
agreements are later found to be enforceable Ä to ensure that 
release-dismissal agreements are, whenever possible, written down.  
The standard will therefore have the salutary effect of reducing 
the overall risk of misunderstandings in the conclusion of release- 
dismissal agreements, and increasing the accuracy of juries' 
decisions as to whether a release-dismissal agreement was concluded 
voluntarily. 
     Since, when this case was first remanded, the parties 
challenging the enforceability of the Livingstones' oral release- 
dismissal agreement were only required to establish the 
voluntariness of the agreement under a preponderance-of-the- 
evidence standard, the jury's finding of voluntariness will be 
vacated.  If, on this remand, it again becomes necessary to address 
the issue of voluntariness, the more demanding clear-and-convincing 
standard will be utilized.   
 
B.  Instruction on Existence of a Legitimate Criminal Justice 
Objective. 
     The Livingstones sought to have the district court instruct 
the jury that one of the factors for it to consider in determining 
whether they voluntarily entered into the release-dismissal 
agreement was "whether there is a l[e]gitimate criminal justice 
objective to support [the agreement's] validity."  Livingstones' 
Proposed Jury Instruction 10, App. at 394.  The district court 
declined to so instruct; the Livingstones contend that this was 
error. 
     Evidently the rationale for the proposed instruction was that 
the Livingstones sought to argue to the jury that elements of the 
public-interest analysis should enter into the jury's evaluation of 
whether the agreement was voluntary.  We see no reason why the 
public-interest issue is pertinent to the jury's consideration of 
the voluntariness issue, and we therefore think the district court 
was correct in concluding that such an instruction would have been 
inappropriate. 
 
C.  Admission of Ceraso's Testimony. 
     The district court found that, by challenging the release- 
dismissal agreement, the Livingstones had waived any claim of 
attorney-client privilege as to the testimony of Ceraso, Mrs. 
Livingstone's lawyer at her criminal proceeding.  Accordingly, the 
district court permitted Ceraso to be deposed, and then allowed him 
to be called as a witness at the voluntariness proceeding.  App. at 
101.  On appeal, the Livingstones argue that this decision was 
erroneous.  We disagree. 
     "The attorney-client privilege is waived for any relevant 
communication if the client asserts as a material issue in a 
proceeding that: (a) the client acted upon the advice of a lawyer 
or that the advice was otherwise relevant to the legal significance 
of the client's conduct."  Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers 
130(1) (Final Draft No. 1, 1996); see also Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[A] 
party can waive the attorney client privilege by asserting claims 
that put his or her attorney's advice in issue in the 
litigation.").  The Livingstones' complaint states that Washington 
Township "may seek to assert as a possible defense a purported 
agreement not to sue and/or release," but that the Township "will 
not be able to sustain its burden that the same was entered into in 
a knowing and voluntary fashion."  App. at 21.  The complaint goes 
on to state that the agreement was not "knowing" because 
"[p]laintiffs, at the time, were unaware that the same could be 
interpreted as foregoing a damage claim.  They specifically were 
unaware of the precise extent of any claimed waiver."  App. at 22.  
The Livingstones made similar claims before the district court and 
on appeal. 
     Mrs. Livingstone was represented by counsel at her criminal 
trial; her attorney played a central role in the negotiation of the 
release-dismissal agreement.  Under Rumery, the advice of counsel 
is an explicit, and important, element of the voluntariness 
analysis.  See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394; id. at 401 (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (citing, as one of the factors bearing on the 
enforceability of a release-dismissal agreement, "importantly, 
whether the defendant was counseled").  Mrs. Livingstone's 
assertion that she did not appreciate the release-dismissal 
agreement's legal implications is tantamount to a claim that her 
attorney did not give her accurate legal advice.  It would be 
unfair to allow her to make this claim without permitting the 
opposing parties to investigate her attorney's version of the 
relevant events.  See United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 
1292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 813 (1991) (holding that a 
party who asserts a claim that "in fairness requires examination of 
protected communications" thereby waives the attorney-client 
privilege as to those communications).  In the terms of the draft 
Restatement, Mrs. Livingstone has effectively asserted that the 
advice provided to her by her attorney is "relevant to the legal 
significance of [her] conduct."  Accordingly, we find no error in 
the district court's ruling that the attorney-client privilege had 
been waived.  
 
D.  Exclusion of Expert Testimony. 
     The Livingstones challenge the district court's decision, at 
the voluntariness proceeding, to exclude the testimony of their 
expert, John Peters, who had prepared a report addressing the 
underlying liability of the police officers and of Washington 
Township.  Mrs. Livingstone's attorney, Ceraso, had testified that 
he had advised Mrs. Livingstone to conclude a release-dismissal 
agreement because any damages that she would recover in a 
subsequent civil suit would have been largely, or completely, 
offset by the damages that the police officers would recover, 
assuming that they filed counterclaims.  App. at 767.  The 
plaintiffs sought to introduce Peters' testimony in order to 
demonstrate that Ceraso's advice had been inaccurate.  The district 
court found that Peters' testimony was inadmissible under Rule 702, 
because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence, and under Rule 403, because of prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, misleading the jury, and waste of time.  App. at 777.  
     We will address only the district court's application of Rule 
403, which we find was entirely appropriate.  Peters' report was 
quite likely to be prejudicial; it asserted, in considerable 
detail, that Washington Township and the police-officer defendants 
had violated Mrs. Livingstone's civil rights.  A jury presented 
with a substantial amount of information on the merits of an 
underlying civil rights action might well look to those merits in 
making its decision on the distinct Ä and distinctly different Ä 
issue of voluntariness, thus creating a significant risk of 
prejudice.   
     Rule 403 requires that a court balance the prejudicial effect 
of proposed evidence against its probative value.  If evidence that 
a party to a release-dismissal agreement had received improper 
legal advice is of sufficient probative value, this analysis may 
well weigh in favor of admissibility.  The probative value of 
Peters' testimony was not, however, high, as it did not engage 
Ceraso's testimony directly.  Ceraso's advice to Mrs. Livingstone 
had addressed the net award of damages that she could expect from 
her potential civil suit against the police and their potential 
civil suit against her.  Peters' report only barely touched on the 
merits of a possible civil suit by the police against Mrs. 
Livingstone, and did not discuss the likely award of damages in 
either suit.  Thus, his testimony would not have greatly helped 
the jury to understand the correctness of Ceraso's advice. 
 
E.  Exclusion of Trial Transcript. 
     At the trial of the voluntariness issue, counsel for the 
Livingstones sought to introduce into evidence an exchange between 
Heneks and Judge Cicchetti that occurred the day before the 
release-dismissal agreement purportedly was concluded.  The 
district court found that this exchange was not relevant, and 
excluded it.  The Livingstones appeal this ruling, asserting that 
Judge Cicchetti's comments in the exchange that they sought to 
introduce resembled his later remarks at the release-dismissal 
colloquy, and that the Livingstones might have been misled into 
believing that he was simply repeating his earlier comments.  We 
agree with the district court's finding that this exchange is not 
relevant.  Judge Cicchetti's comments in the portion of the 
exchange presented to the district court, App. at 790, bore little 
resemblance to his later comments at the release-dismissal 
proceeding, Appellees' App. at 32. 
 
VI.  Application of Pennsylvania Law to the Livingstones' State-Law 
Claims. 
     As we noted in our discussion of the procedural history of 
this case, the district court dismissed a number of the 
Livingstones' state-law claims on grounds, such as the statute of 
limitations, unrelated to the release-dismissal agreement.  The 
dismissal of those claims is not before us on appeal.  The 
remaining state-law claims included claims of assault and battery 
against defendants Monack and Snyder; a claim of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress against defendants Monack, Snyder, 
and Moody; and a claim of conversion against all defendants.   
     Neither the parties nor the district court have discussed what 
standard applies to determine the enforceability of the release- 
dismissal agreement as to the state-law claims.  Instead, they have 
apparently assumed that the standard applicable to these claims is 
no different from that applicable to section 1983 claims.  This is 
not necessarily true; the question whether the Livingstones have 
waived their claims under state law is itself one of state law,  
see Livingstone I, 12 F.3d at 1210 n.6, and state law cannot be 
assumed to parallel federal law on this question.   
     In Livingstone I, we observed that the courts of Pennsylvania 
"frequently follow the principles set forth in the Restatement [of 
Contracts],"  id., and suggested that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court might be likely to do as the United States Supreme Court did 
in Rumery, and look to the public-interest analysis in the 
Restatement of Contracts to determine when it is appropriate to 
enforce a release-dismissal agreement.  See id.  However, we did 
not then have occasion to decide precisely what standard 
Pennsylvania would apply to the enforcement of a release-dismissal 
agreement.  That question is now before us.  Indeed, that question 
subsumes two distinct questions: (1) What standard would 
Pennsylvania courts be likely to apply to determine whether the 
enforcement of a release-dismissal agreement is in the public 
interest?  (2) What standard would Pennsylvania courts be likely to 
apply to determine the voluntariness of a release-dismissal 
agreement? 
 
A.  Public Interest 
     We have discovered no reported Pennsylvania cases addressing 
the question of when, if ever, it is in the public interest to 
enforce a release-dismissal agreement.  Our analysis of the caselaw 
and policies of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has persuaded us, 
however, that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would apply a 
public-interest standard resembling that applied under federal law. 
     The courts of Pennsylvania have long declined to enforce 
contracts that are contrary to public policy.  See, e.g., Kuhn v. 
Buhl, 96 A. 977 (Pa. 1916) (finding unenforceable as against public 
policy an agreement between bidders for public lands under which 
one of them would, in exchange for a fee, withdraw its bid).  After 
Kuhn, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accepted the standard set 
forth in section 320(1) of Tentative Draft No. 12 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (March 1, 1977) as its standard 
for the nonenforcement of contracts as against public policy.  SeeCentral 
Dauphin School District v. American Casualty Co., 426 A.2d 
94, 96 (Pa. 1981).  Section 320(1) of the Tentative Draft was to 
emerge (with one minor stylistic alteration not relevant here) as 
Section 178(1) of the Restatement (Second) as finally adopted.  It 
provides that "[a] promise or other term of an agreement is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if legislation provides 
that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is 
clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against 
the enforcement of such terms."  Restatement (Second) of Contracts 178(1) 
(1981).  We may reasonably conclude Ä as the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court has already concluded, see Donegal Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Long, 564 A.2d 937, 942 (Pa. Super. 1989) Ä that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, having accepted tentative section 
320(1) in Central Dauphin, would now accept permanent section 
178(1).   
     In Rumery, the Supreme Court drew upon section 178(1) to 
fashion its federal common-law rule that a release-dismissal 
agreement will be unenforceable "if the interest in its enforcement 
is outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy harmed by 
enforcement of the agreement."  Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392 & n.2.  We 
think that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not only draw on 
section 178(1) in considering the enforceability of a release- 
dismissal agreement but, in construing that section's open 
language, would look to Rumery and its progeny in the courts of 
appeals as persuasive authority.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would, of course, also consider the policies of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, as expressed in the Commonwealth's statutes and 
common law.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has treated 
Pennsylvania's common law as an important instrument for curbing 
official misconduct, paralleling at the level of state law the 
United States Supreme Court's view of the policies underlying 
section 1983.  See, e.g. Supervisors of Lewis Township v. Employers 
Mutual Casualty Co., 523 A.2d 719, 722 (Pa. 1987) (finding that 
permitting insurance coverage of willful or fraudulent conduct on 
the part of a public official is contrary to Pennsylvania law and 
public policy, as personal financial liability is intended to deter 
official misconduct).  We therefore conclude that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would subject agreements that purport to waive tort 
liability to at least as careful scrutiny as the United States 
Supreme Court has applied to agreements purporting to waive 
liability under section 1983. 
     The Livingstones argue that the law of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania strictly limits the private resolution of criminal 
charges.  In support of this claim, they cite Pennsylvania Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 314, a rule permitting a form of court- 
supervised settlement in certain types of criminal cases.  That 
rule provides:  
     When a defendant is charged with an offense which is not 
     alleged to have been committed by force or violence or threat 
     thereof, the court may order the case to be dismissed upon 
     motion and a showing that: 
 
               (a) the public interest will not be adversely 
               affected; 
               (b) the attorney for the Commonwealth consents to 
               the dismissal; 
               (c) satisfaction has been made to the aggrieved 
               person or there is an agreement that satisfaction 
               will be made to the aggrieved person; 
               (d) there is an agreement as to who shall pay the 
               costs. 
 
Pa. R. Crim. P. 314.  The Livingstones assert that the fact that 
this rule does not permit settlements in the case of offenses 
"alleged to have been committed by force or violence or threat 
thereof" implies that such settlements are disfavored, or perhaps 
prohibited, under Pennsylvania law.   
     We are not persuaded that Rule 314 demonstrates that 
Pennsylvania would not permit release-dismissal agreements in other 
situations.  A prosecutor who has sound public-interest reasons for 
declining to go forward with a prosecution, or for terminating a 
prosecution after it has begun, must have the authority to do so.  
As a corollary of this authority, a prosecutor presumably also has 
the authority to condition a dismissal on some undertaking by the 
defendant. 
     We find, however, that Rule 314 demonstrates that the courts 
of Pennsylvania would be likely to subject release-dismissal 
agreements to close scrutiny.  Further, the fact that Rule 314(a) 
requires that a judge determine that "the public interest will not 
be adversely affected" by a dismissal demonstrates the 
Commonwealth's commitment to reviewing release-dismissal agreements 
for their impact on the public interest.  The Pennsylvania courts 
have also read Rule 314's limitations on the circumstances in which 
criminal prosecutions may be dismissed to indicate that "the law 
does not favor out-of-court compromise over prosecution."  
Commonwealth v. Pettinato, 520 A.2d 437, 439 (Pa. Super. 1987) 
(concluding that an offer from a criminal defendant to pay a 
complainant a fee in exchange for her agreement not to testify was 
admissible into evidence in the defendant's criminal trial; because 
Rule 314 strictly limits consensual dismissals in criminal cases, 
the civil rule of evidence barring the admission of offers of 
settlement into evidence did not apply).   
     In summary, then, we find that Pennsylvania would be likely to 
permit release-dismissal agreements to be enforced in some cases, 
but would monitor them closely to ensure that their enforcement is 
in the public interest.  The federal rule, which places the burden 
of proving that a release-dismissal agreement is in the public 
interest on those seeking to enforce the agreement, has the same 
goals.  Pennsylvania would therefore be likely to apply a very 
similar rule. 
 
B.  Voluntariness 
     The Court observed in Rumery that private citizens are 
permitted to waive their constitutional rights in many 
circumstances.  For instance, criminal defendants may waive 
constitutional rights through plea bargaining, and the resulting 
agreements are ordinarily enforced if they are voluntary.  
Voluntary release-dismissal agreements, Rumery reasoned, should 
therefore also be permitted.  See 480 U.S. at 393-94.  
     Pennsylvania, too, permits plea bargaining, see, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Spence, 627 A.2d 1176, 1184 (Pa. 1993), and will 
uphold a guilty plea if it is knowing and voluntary, seeCommonwealth v. 
Alston, 373 A.2d 741, 743 (Pa. 1977).  We believe 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would be likely to follow a 
line of logic similar to that of the Court in Rumery, and permit 
release-dismissal agreements upon a showing of voluntariness. 
     However, we anticipate that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would be very attentive to how the voluntariness of a release- 
dismissal agreement is established.  Such judicial attentiveness 
would be called for both because of the danger that such agreements 
will be concluded in improper circumstances, and because 
Pennsylvania has a policy of declining to enforce contracts 
concluded under duress or threat of prosecution.  See, e.g., 
Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 143 (Pa. Super. 
1985) (applying a rule that threats of criminal prosecution 
constitute duress rendering a contract voidable, and stating: "It 
is an affront to our judicial sensibilities that one person's 
ability to seek another's prosecution can be bartered and sold the 
same as commodities in the market place.  It is even more repugnant 
when the foul stench of oppression pervades the transaction.").  
For reasons we have already discussed, the voluntariness of oral 
release-dismissal agreements is especially likely to be 
problematic, and Ä precisely because such agreements are not 
evidenced by a writing Ä determinations of the voluntariness of 
such agreements are particularly likely to be unreliable.  Seesupra at 35 
- 42.  Accordingly, we predict that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, when faced with the question, will subject the 
voluntariness of oral release-dismissal agreements to a heightened 
standard of proof, and we therefore conclude that the voluntariness 
of the release-dismissal agreement now before us must be 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. 
   
VII.  Conclusion. 
     For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the judgment 
of the district court and remand for further proceedings in 
accordance with this opinion.  
 
------------------------------------------------ 
 
